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ABSTRACT
The  Internet  continues  to  expand  drastically  as  a  result  of  explosion  of  mobile  devices,
content, server virtualization, and advancement of cloud services. This increase has significantly
changed traffic patterns within the enterprise data centres. Therefore, advanced technologies are
needed to improve traditional network deployments to enable them to handle the changing network
patterns.  Software  defined  networks  (SDN)  and  network  function  virtualisation  (NFV)  are
innovative technologies that enable network flexibility, increase network and service agility, and
support  service-driven  virtual  networks  using  concepts  of  virtualisation  and  softwarisation.
Collaboration of these two concepts enable cloud operator to offer network-as-a-service (NaaS) to
multiple tenants in a data-centre deployment.
Despite the benefits brought by these technologies, they also bring along security challenges
that  need  to  be  addressed  and  managed  to  ensure  successful  deployment  and encourage  faster
adoption in industry. This dissertation proposes security solution based on tenant isolation, network
access control (NAC) and network reconfiguration that can be implemented in NFV multi-tenant
deployment to guarantee privacy and security of tenant functions.
The evaluation of the proof-of-concept framework proves that SDN based tenant isolation
solution provides a high level  of isolation in a multi-tenant  NFV cloud. It  also shows that  the
proposed  network  reconfiguration  greatly  reduces  chances  of  an  attacker  correctly  identifying
location and IP addresses of tenant functions within the cloud environment. Because of resource
limitation, the proposed NAC solution was not evaluated. The efficiency of this solution for multi-
tenancy NFV has been added as part of future work. 
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1. Introduction
The Internet continues to expand in size as a result of rapid increase in mobile traffic, online
services (search engines, social networks and web content in multiple data centres), higher data
rates, server virtualisation and advent of cloud services. This increase has significantly changed
traffic  patterns  within  traditional  network  architectures  [1].  While  attempting  to  rapidly  deploy
services to meet the dynamic customer demands, the proprietary nature of hardware poses a huge
challenge for network operators [2].  These network devices that are usually vendor locked offer
dedicated services, which implies the need for additional nodes to introduce new customer services.
This  translates  to  cost  of  purchasing  the  nodes,  additional  floor  space,  power  and  need  for
specialised expertise to handle the increased operational complexity. The operator is thus faced with
tedious error prone process of manually configuring the ever increasing number of devices. To cope
with  these  demands,  networks  have  to  be  much  smarter  and  be  able  to  control  and  manage
themselves better [3].
Collaboration  of  academic  and industry  research  has  proposed innovative  solutions  that
allow  networks  to  dynamically  adapt  to  fluctuating  network  demands.  Network  Function
Virtualisation (NFV) and Software Defined Networks (SDN) are examples of such solutions. These
are two independent technologies that are based on cloud computing technologies. They promise
network  flexibility,  increased  network  and  service  agility,  and  support  service-driven  virtual
networks using concepts of virtualisation and softwarisation [2]. 
SDN implements a network control plane that has a global view of the network and decision
making  capabilities  in  a  logically  centralised  and  fully-programmable  software  platform  by
decoupling  it  from the  network  forwarding  devices  [3].  The  network  programmability  enables
automation of network policies that define dynamic control, change, and management of network
behaviour. The functionality is implemented from a single central point and can therefore be easily
inherited by all the nodes in the network. This reduces administration tasks, deployment time and
configuration errors. The rules can flexibly be upgraded or modified using high level programming
languages to enhance network services based on customer and network requirements. 
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NFV  on  the  other  hand  defines  network  functions  as  software  instances  that  can  be
instantiated in open and standardised IT virtualization environment [4]. NFV enables deployment of
multiple  functions  in  one  computing  node  therefore  greatly  reducing  CAPEX  and  OPEX  as
compared to traditional networks where one device is mapped to only one network function. The
software  defined function  can  easily  be  modified  to  suit  the  required  service  and they  can  be
instantiated or terminated on demand, hence enabling rapid service provisioning at a much reduced
cost.
Logical integration of SDN and NFV enables cloud operators to provide a new cloud-based
service model—Network-as-a-Service ( NaaS ) similar to the traditional cloud models Infrastructure
as-a-service (IaaS), Platform as-a-service (PaaS) and software as-a-service (SaaS) [5]. This model
allows  operators  to  lease  virtual  resources  that  can  be  used  to  run  software  defined  network
functions  for  different  tenants.  SDN  can  be  used  to  enable  innovative,  agile  and  simplified
management  of  these  virtual  networks  [6].  In  such  an  environment  the  cloud  operator  has  to
guarantee privacy and security for the hosted tenant networks.
This integration introduces automation, simplifies monitoring and management, and enables
networks  to  adapt  to  different  traffic  loads  [2].  This  dissertation  proposes  SDN based security
solutions that can be implemented by cloud operator offering NaaS to multiple tenants in a data-
centre. The solution implements tenant isolation, network access control (NAC) implemented by
authentication, authorisation and accounting (AAA), and network reconfiguration that makes it hard
to learn virtual network topologies and their properties. The proposed framework and solutions are
implemented using components of two open-source tools—OpenDaylight (ODL) and OpenStack
that enable collaboration of SDN and NFV.
1.2. Problem Statement
In the above discussed NaaS model, tenant networks will come and go, VNFs and service
chaining will  change frequently to balance load across the infrastructure [7].  This continuously
changing environment makes network management more complex. NFV also inherits most of the
cloud  characteristics  such  as  virtualisation,  multi-tenancy,  application  sharing  and  open  source
software. Therefore, it  adopts associated security threats like authentication, information leakage
and data corruption [6]. This architecture allows for flexible and dynamic provisioning of virtual
functions based on demand. In this type of deployment, tenants are bound to be concerned about
data confidentiality, integrity and isolation from other tenants.
Cloud  operators  therefore  need  to  come  up  with  a  convincing  NAC solution  to  assure
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tenants'  security.  One  of  the  major  security  challenges  as  discussed  in  [5]  and  [10]  is  tenant
authentication, authorization and accounting (AAA). For the service model considered in this work,
each tenant is granted administrative rights to combine and configure VNFs to form a network
service, software upgrades and function management. The tenant may also want to add or terminate
functions into the architecture by migrating VMs in or out of the cloud environment. The tenant
domain  consumes  resources  from  the  cloud  infrastructure  using  cloud  orchestration  tools  to
orchestrate and operate virtual infrastructure resources required by functions and associated service
chains [4]. These resources are the same resource shared between all tenants. The cloud operator
has to ensure that each tenant only has access to its hosted functions and cannot access colleague
tenants data.
In a multi-tenant set-up, it is important to guarantee tenants complete isolation and privacy.
The tenants hosted may sometimes even be competitors. The tenant should not be aware of the
presence of other tenants and their functions or operations. Tenants may also at times attempt to
utilize  more  than  maximum allocated  resource  eating  up  those  reserved  for  colleague  tenants.
Administrators also need to minimize risk of the VPN connection used by the tenants to access the
cloud from being hijacked by an external attacker to access the cloud resource in the pretence of
being the tenant.
Static  assignment  of  IP  addresses  to  network  functions  give  attackers  an  asymmetric
advantage in that they have the time to study a network, identify its vulnerabilities, and choose the
time and place of attack to gain the maximum benefit [17]. Attackers normally use scanning tools
and worms to send probes to random IP addresses in the network in order to discover their targets.
When a target responds, it can then be identified and attacked. Unreachable addresses will therefore
be considered unused. The static nature of current networks and computing systems makes it easy
for them to be attacked and harder to defend [16].
The dynamic nature of the NFV cloud environment requires an automated, scalable, agile
and flexible management mechanism. This is achievable by using the software defined networks
(SDN) phenomena which enables definition of network rules using software. This rules can be used
to implement NAC to regulate tenants requesting the cloud resources, virtual network isolation and
network reconfiguration strategies.
1.3. Aim and Objectives
The aim of this work is to propose security measures to secure tenant networks in a multi-
tenancy NFV deployment in a data-centre. One of the solutions implements a NAC that ensures
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functions hosted by cloud service provider are manipulated by only authorized tenants. The solution
introduces a policy based SDN application that allows the cloud operator to define security rules
and to partition the cloud resources into logical security zones to achieve tenant isolation. It also
proposes an SDN based network reconfiguration solution that will make the VTNs to dynamically
change IP addresses and interfaces. This can be deployed by a cloud operator to minimise internal
attack initiatives from other tenants and from external attacks. This aim can be achieved by the set
of objectives below:
 To review security  challenges  introduced by NFV multi-tenant  deployment  and existing
related SDN and NFV solutions.
 To propose and model security rules to regulate tenant access into the NFV cloud resources
and authorisation of tenants to rightfully allocated resources.
 To design a framework that is able to partition the network into logically isolated zones to
offer tenant isolation and privacy. 
 To  model  a  solution  that  pro-actively  change  the  network  configuration  using  MTD
techniques to make virtual networks secure while keeping network functionality transparent.
 To implement and evaluate the proposed SDN based security  solution for multi-tenancy
NFV.
1.4. Scope
The solution proposed in this work is designed for SDN based multi-tenancy deployment of
the NFV in a data-centre. This arrangement allows tenants to administer their virtual functions and
service chaining. This dissertation focuses on tenant authentication, authorization and accounting
for tenants accessing their respective control traffic in the NFV architecture. It also proposes logical
security zones that ensure isolation and confidentiality between tenants hosted functions, therefore
tenants will only be allowed to modify functions and manipulate service chaining in their respective
predefined zones. It further defines network reconfiguration of VNF properties to make it tricky for
attackers to identify their location and IP addresses. The proposed security solutions focus mainly
on the following:
 Only manages access on the control plane and the user plane is left default as defined by the
ETSI NFV.
 Tenant data isolation.
 Tenant authentication, authorization and accounting.
 Reconfiguration of IP address and interfaces of the VNFs in a data-centre.
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1.5. Dissertation Outline
   In this chapter, a concise introduction to the concept of network programmability and
virtualization that enable cloud operators to offer NaaS to multiple tenant is made. The chapter
further discusses security challenges faced by cloud operators offering this kind of deployment. The
aims and objectives of this research work are also presented. The scope of the dissertation and an
outline of this dissertation report is given in this chapter.
Chapter  2  discusses  in  detail  the  SDN  and  NFV  technologies  and  their  respective
architectures.  A literature  review  on  the  proposed  security  solution  for  multi-tenancy  NFV is
conducted by analysing previous approaches  that  tackle similar  security  challenges.  Ideas  from
SDN based solutions proposed for traditional networks and cloud architectures are reviewed and
used to model NAC solution for multi-tenancy NFV. Security solutions proposed for NFV are also
reviewed. The idea of security zoning is proposed to built logical partitions between VTNs. The
concept of Moving target defence (MTD) is also studied and the idea of network reconfiguration is
extended to the NFV cloud deployment.
Chapter 3 presents the framework that is proposed for the implementation of multi-tenancy
NFV in a cloud environment using SDN technology. The three main components of the framework
—data plane cloud environment that provide virtual machines that hosts the VNFs, Control plane
consisting of an SDN controller and a cloud orchestrator, and application plane built of software-
defined network rules defined by the cloud operator. The chapter further explains in detail how the
there planes interact with each other using APIs.  
   Chapter  4  presents  a  proof  of  concept  (PoC)  implementation  of  the  proposed NaaS
architecture from chapter 3. The chapter introduces the tools and technologies used to implement
the SDN based multi-tenancy NFV framework. Components from two main open-source tools –
OpenDaylight  and Openstack are used for implementation of the PoC. A detailed design of how
these tools and technologies can be set-up used to implement the PoC is also presented. The chapter
also discusses in detail the proposed security challenges.
Chapter  5  evaluates  the  implemented  NFV multi-tenancy  framework  and  analyses  the
efficiency of  the  proposed security  solutions.  An analysis  is  made on the  isolation  mechanism
proposed between VTNs residing in one physical compute node. A test scenario is presented and
analysed to  justify  the  logical  separation  between the  VTNs.  The effectiveness  of  the  network
reconfiguration  concept  is  also  analysed  and  evaluated  based  on  three  matrices:  deception,
deterrence and length of flow table against scanning tools that are normally used by attackers to
probe a network for vulnerabilities.
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In chapter 6,  a conclusion for the entire dissertation is made. The technologies behind the
problem  statement  have  been  introduced.  Past  solutions  based  on  SDN  and  NFV  have  been
reviewed  and  analysed  against  the  proposed  security  solution  in  this  work.  An  SDN  based
framework  that  enables  multi-tenancy  NFV deployment  has  been  presented.  The  PoC  for  the
proposed architecture is also presented that illustrates how Openstack and OpenDaylight were used
to  implement  the  proposed  framework.  The  efficiency  of  the  proposed  security  solution  and
implemented SDN based multi-tenancy NFV deployment is evaluated and analysed in this work.
This dissertation illustrate the benefits of integrating an SDN controller into the NFV architecture to
simplify implementation and management of security in the fluctuating NFV environment.  
1.6. Chapter Summary
Chapter 1 gives a brief introduction of the technologies on which this dissertation is based—
NFV and SDN. It discusses how integration of these two enables cloud operators to offer NaaS to
multiple tenants. A discussion on the security challenges faced by operators offering this model is
also  made.  The  chapter  further  explicitly  defines  how  this  dissertation  aims  to  solve  these
challenges  in  section  1.3  by  presenting  the  aims  and objectives  of  the  dissertation.  The  scope
covered by this work is presented, as well as the outline of this dissertation report.
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CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1. Introduction
This  chapter  presents in  detail  the technologies on which this  work is  based—Software
defined networks (SDN) and Network function virtualisation (NFV) – and studies how the two can
be  used  to  complement  each  other  to  offer  Network  as-a-service  (NaaS)  to  multiple  tenants.
Security solutions that have been proposed for NFV in the past are revised and their strengths and
weaknesses identified. A review on SDN based security solutions proposed for traditional networks
and cloud architectures is also made and some of the ideas are used to model a network access
control (NAC) solution and define logical partitions for multiple virtual tenants deployed in one
compute environment. The moving target defence (MTD) concept is introduced and past solutions
using this technique are also reviewed. From this, a network reconfiguration concept is extended to
the NFV cloud that will dynamically change IP addresses and interfaces of the network functions in
the  NFV cloud  deployment.  The  security  solutions  proposed  in  this  dissertation  are  therefore
implemented as SDN application managing an NFV cloud environment. 
2.2. Network Function Virtualisation
2.2.1 NFV Architecture
NFV is an initiative defined by European Telecommunication standards Institute (ETSI) to
address the operational complexities and high costs of managing the closed and proprietary devices
deployed throughout Telecom networks, with the aim to enable agile deployment of service at a
reduced  cost  [4].  NFV  defines  virtualised  infrastructure  for  network  functions  using  cloud
technologies  [5].  It  decouples  the  network  functions  from underlying  hardware  so  they  run  as
software instances in any compute node. This technology enables efficient utilisation of resources
by allowing different functions to share computing resources (storage, CPU and network). It also
improve network flexibility by enabling instantiation of functions on demand and rapid service
provisioning based on software deployments.
The NFV functions, named virtual network functions (VNFs) can be implemented as virtual
machines  (VM),  and  can  therefore  be  accessed  like  Information  Technology  (IT)  services  as
beneﬁted  from  cloud  computing  technologies  [4].  The  VNFs  can  be  dynamically  added  and
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removed on-demand reducing administration  tasks,  response  times  and costs.  Figure 2.1 below
shows the NFV architecture as discussed by ETSI draft document in [3]. This NFV framework has
three main working domains: 
 Network Function  Virtual  Infrastructure  (NFVI):   includes  hardware  servers,  the  virtual
layer  which  can  integrate  and  virtualise  the  hardware  resources  (compute,  storage,  and
network)  and the abstract virtual resources.
 Virtual Network Function (VNF) : the software images that are capable of running over the
NFVI.
 Management  and  Orchestration  (MANO):  built  of  an  Orchestrator,  Virtual  Network
Function Manager (VNFM) and Virtual Infrastructure Manager (VIM) functional blocks.
The two main responsibilities of the MANO are orchestration of NFVI resources across
multiple VIMs and management of Network Services. The VNFM is responsible for VNF
life-cycle  management.  The  VIM  is  in  charge  of  controlling  and  managing  the  NFVI
resources.
Figure 2. 1 NFV architecture[6]
2.2.2. Multi-tenancy NFV
The concept of NFV introduces new business models for cloud service providers. Operators
can provide network-as-a-service (NaaS) to multiple tenants in a data centre deployment by leasing
VMs that can be used to run the VNFs [7]. In multi-tenancy, operators have to implement logical
separation of resources residing in the same physical infrastructure to guarantee tenant isolation and
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privacy. The resources offered must provide security and isolation of sensitive data and applications
in  tenant  networks.  Therefore,  cloud  operators  need  to  find  smart  management  solutions  for
seamless multi-tenancy deployments in data centres [4]. Cloud services providers can deploy NFV
in either one of the following service model [7]:
 Network Function Virtualisation Infrastructure as a service (NFVIaaS): allows enterprises to
host VNF instances inside the cloud infrastructure which is operated as a service by a Cloud
Service Provider.
 Virtual  Network  Platform  as  a  service  (VNPaaS):  operator  provides  infrastructure  and
applications  as  a  platform  on  which  the  Enterprise  can  deploy  and  manipulate  their
functions.
 Virtual Network Function as a service (VNFaaS): operator administered networking features
are provided as a service to tenants.
2.2.3. NFV security solutions
This  section  presents  solution  that  have  been  proposed  in  the  past  to  secure  the  NFV
environment. B. Jaeger [19] and B. Cataldo et.al [20] presents NFV security solutions that can be
incorporated  into  the  ETSI  NFV  architecture.  Bernd  proposes  a  security  Orchestrator.  This
Orchestrator is responsible for the management of security of the entire architecture and the security
functions deployed within the architecture. [20] presents a policy manager that is also incorporated
into the NFV architecture. The policy manager translates users' High Level Policy defined using
sentences close to natural language. The policy specify security requirements and defines processes
for deployment and configuration of security functions. The solution in this work proposes security
functionality that can be implemented as an SDN application, with the controller incorporated into
the NFV architecture. The solution is based on SDN to allow fast and easy modification of the
policies based on tenant or changing security requirements.
Security zoning has been discussed in [20], [21], and [22] as solution for tenant isolation in
multi-tenant NFV deployment. It suggests partitioning of the architecture into logical segments to
isolate and protect virtual tenant networks. R. Mijumbi et al. [22] further explains that management
of this zones can be deployed using SDN to allow automation and easy update of security rules for
the zones. From these ideas, the proposed solution defines the logical security zones to provide
complete  privacy and isolation  of  tenant  networks.  Figure  2.2 below illustrates  the  concept  of
zoning based of three datacenter deployment.
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 Figure 2. 2 Security zoning [19]
As discussed in the ETSI NFV problem statement [8] the NFV inherits most of the multi-
tenant cloud deployment models. Solutions proposed for the cloud security can also be extended to
NFV.  D.  Zissis  and D.  Lekkas  in  [23]  presents  a  solution  that  proposes  tenant  authentication,
authorisation and accounting (AAA) by introducing a trusted third party that will validate tenants
security certificates before allowing them through to the cloud. Cloud security solutions presented
in [24] and [25] suggests another security measure for cloud platform architecture. They proposes
use of IPSec based Virtual private networks (VPN) to secure link between cloud and enterprise
sites. The NFV solution proposed by this work also uses the idea of digital certificates together with
IPSec based VPN to validate tenants into the NFV cloud. Unlike in [23], here the solution is based
within the cloud infrastructure which reduces cost of paying a third party, increases agility that
allows cloud administrator to update and modify the security rules, and reduces the security target
surface by decreasing connection route.
2.3. Software Defined Networks (SDN)
2.3.1. SDN Architecture
SDN is another innovative technology defined by Open Network Foundation (ONF) with
closely  related  objectives  to  those  of  the  NFV [2].  It  proposes  a  centralised  architecture  that
decouples control plane from data plane and introduces network programmability, which makes it
possible  to  dynamically  control,  change,  and  manage  network  behaviour  through  software,
providing programmable interfaces into the network [4]. SDN architecture consists of three planes:
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application, control and data as illustrated in Figure 2.3 below. The application layer consists of
customised network applications that specifies data management rules and upgrade logic to the
controller. Northbound APIs (NB-API) are used for communication between these two planes. The
control plane consists of one or more centralised controllers. The controller uses the logic from the
smart  application  to  make  forwarding  decisions  in  the  data  plane.  The  data  plane  consists  of
forwarding devices. Southbound API is used to enable communication between the data and control
planes. Below are examples of southbound APIs that exist [8]:
 OpenFlow  Protocol:  Most  popular  southbound  protocol  defined  by  ONF  for  used  to
transport a control logic function from a switch to a controller.
 Open vSwitch DataBase Management Protocol (OVSDB): Management protocol used by
OpenvSwitch open source software switch.
 Locator ID Separation Protocol (LISP): It uses IP address and location framework suitable
for overlay network applications, such as data centre network virtualization.
 Network Configuration Protocol (NETCONF): The protocol is used for networking devices
configuration.
This evolution makes it possible to intelligently and flexibly control traffic flows to achieve
best network throughput,  perform traffic monitoring and analysis,  and smart intrusion detection
using customised user algorithms [2]. 
 
Figure 2. 3 SDN architecture[12]
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SDN controller  can be integrated into  the  NFV architecture  to  simplify monitoring  and
management by offering a scalable, elastic, automated and on-demand architecture necessary for the
dynamic NFV communications [2, 9]. This work illustrates the benefits of using collaboration of
SDN and NFV for  implementation  of  NAC, tenant  isolation  and network reconfiguration.  The
implementation  plan  discussed  later  proposes  the  use  of  a  JAVA based  open-source  tool—
OpenDayLight and OpenStack for execution of the design. The cloud operator can add, manipulate
and update SDN applications within the controller as need arises. The central controller defines the
rules once for the entire data-centre multi-tenancy NFV deployment. This unique feature of SDN
helps  to  avoid  multiple  definitions,  contradictory  decisions  and  to  assure  the  coherence  in  the
definition [10].
2.3.2. OpenFlow Protocol
OpenFlow is the most common communications interface defined between the control and
forwarding layers of an SDN architecture [2]. It has been standardized by the The Open Networking
Foundation. The OpenFlow architecture consist of the OpenFlow switches, OpenFlow controller
and a dedicated channel connecting the switches and the controller.  The switch functionality is
executed on  basis of a table called the flow table. The flow tables composed of headers- used to
identify  packets,  counter  –  incremented  each  time  the  flow is  executed  and  the  actions-  give
instruction on how to handle packet [8]. The controller installs flow table entries in switches, so that
these  switches  can  forward  traffic  according  to  these  entries.  By  insertion,  modification  and
removal of flow entries, the controller can modify the behaviour of the switches with regard to
forwarding.
Three  classes  of  communication  exist  in  the  OpenFlow  protocol:  controller-to-switch,
asynchronous  and  symmetric  communication.  The  controller-to-switch  communication  is
responsible for feature detection, configuration, programming the switch and information retrieval
[6].  Asynchronous  communication  is  initiated  by  the  switch  without  any  solicitation  from the
controller and it is used to inform the controller about packet arrivals, state changes at the switch
and errors. Finally, symmetric messages are sent from either side, i.e., the switch or the controller
are free to initiate the communication without solicitation from the other side.
2.3.3. Open Virtual switches (OVS)
The ONF white paper in [8] explain that SDN enables network functions to be programmed
through flow-based software switches and OpenFlow protocol. Open vSwitches (OVS) defined  by
the Linux foundation and OpenFlow Switch (OFS) from the ONF are examples of these software
switches that support fine-grained and flow-level control for packet switching [28]. With the help of
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the central controller, all OpenFlow-based switches can be monitored, manipulated and managed.
The NFV cloud environment proposed in this dissertation is implemented using OVS in the data
plane. Figure 2.4 below shows an OVS, some of the features it provides and enabling protocols.
Tenant VNFs are implemented as software inside OVS VMs. An SDN and Openstack controllers
use OpenFlow and OVSDB management protocol to manage and manipulate the OVS traffic flows.
The controller uses the concept of VLAN isolation to implement isolation and privacy of different
tenant virtual networks. 
Figure 2. 4 Open vSwitch [28]
2.3.4. SDN based Security Solutions
SDN has been used in the past to implement NAC solutions for traditional networks. The
solution FlowNAC discussed in [7] is one such example that presents an SDN based user plane
traffic management solution that authorises users to access network resources according to target
service. It pro-actively defines all services provided by the network operator as flows. It uses the
concept of Virtual Local Area Networks (VLANs) to logically separate network resources.  The
solution presented in this work extends this idea to the NFV architecture. The proposed deployment
architecture pro-actively defines logical network partitions for which only permitted tenants can
access.
FLOWGUARD solution  presented in  [26]  proposes  an  OpenFlow-based framework that
enables detection and resolution of firewall policy violations in traditional networks. This solution
implements a firewall functionality for the dynamic nature of SDN based solution in which network
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state  and  traffic  flow  change  frequently.  During  the  flow  update,  the  FLOWGUARD  checks
network  flow  path  spaces  to  check  any  security  policy  violations.  It  also  defines  intelligent
resolution techniques designed for different update situation to provide violation resolutions in real-
time.  This  solution  demonstrates  how  SDN  introduces  significant  granularity,  visibility  and
flexibility to implementing security policies in the network.
Vmware  white  paper  in  [27]  presents  vCloud  Networking  and  Security  Services  that
implement  software-defined  firewall,  virtual  private  network  (VPN),  load  balancing,  network
address translation (NAT),  Dynamic host  configuration protocol (DHCP)  and virtual  eXtensible
local  area  network  (VxLAN) functionalities  for  cloud environments.  The solution  has  multiple
virtual network interfaces that gives network operators flexibility and confidence to design and
implement business-critical applications, build secure and agile private clouds, and protect their
virtual desktop solutions [26].
24. Moving Target Defence (MTD)
2.4.1. Introduction to MTD
Before  attackers  initiate  attacks  they  normally  first  learn  the  network  topology  and  its
properties using scanning tools. These freely available tools use Internet Control Message Protocol
(ICMP) such as ping and trace route functionalities.  The static  nature of  current  networks and
computing systems give the attackers an asymmetric advantage for the attackers and makes it easy
for them to be probed and identified but harder to defend [14].
The  concept  of  Moving  Target  Defence  (MTD)  is  to  impose  the  same  asymmetric
disadvantage on attackers by making systems dynamic and therefore harder to explore and predict
[15]. With a constantly changing system and its ever adapting attack surface, attackers will have to
deal with a great deal of uncertainty just like network administrators do. This concept is one of the
solutions proposed by the United States Deputy Secretary of Defence report of 2010 addressing
threats in the cyberspace domain. The solution was proposed as part of the Operation Buckshot
Yankee counter-measure after an incident of malware attack of that spread of malicious computer
code across the U.S. military’s computer networks [17]. The attack was from a foreign intelligence
service that resulted in information leak. The ultimate goal of MTD is to increase the attacker’s
workload so as to level the cybersecurity playing field for both defenders and attackers, leading to
even tilting it in favour of the defender [16].
MTD techniques can be classified into three categorises:  network based, host-based and
instrument based. Network-based includes shuffling of IP addresses and dynamic access control
[17].  Host-based  techniques  mutates  the  instructions of  processes,  code,  address  space
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randomisation using cryptography. In Instruction based techniques network administrators can use
honeypot techniques to capture new attacks and to dynamically change the IP addresses [18].
2.4.2. MTD past solutions
Moving Target Defence techniques have been proposed to increase complexity of learning
and identifying network nodes and their vulnerabilities. This is achieved by dynamically changing
network  topologies  and  their  attributes.  Applications  That  Participate  in  Their  Own  Defense
(APOD) scheme presented in [29] is an example of this approach. APOD implements address and
port randomisation using hopping tunnels to hide identity of network nodes from sniffers. However,
this  approach requires cooperation between client and server during the mutation process.  This
disrupts active communication between the end hosts. S. Xu et al in [30] uses MTD to describe
reactive adaptive network solution that adjusts security measures to control and have global security
state. The solution only considers solution after an attack has been launched it is also important to
defend networks to prevent the attacks from happening.
The network address space randomisation solution presented in [31] is an MTD solution
proposing IP hopping technique that protects the network against hit-list worms. The solution uses
network address randomization scheme implemented using DHCP update. However, during address
hopping active communication within the network will be disrupted. This solution also requires
change of host operating systems which makes it costly to  deploy.
Self-shielding  dynamic  network  architecture  presented  in  [32]  dynamically  mutates
appearance of network nodes by installing hypervisors in all network nodes. This approach protects
honeynets from systematic mappings that identifies live and monitored IP addresses, and blacklist
monitored  IPs.  This  is  archived  by  making  the  blacklist  short-lived.  The  nodes  retain  their
Operating system, applications and network communication flow. However, the hypervisor per host
approached use here makes the solution expensive to implement.
Security solutions in [33] and [34] use the MTD techniques that allow mutation of host IP
addresses to deceive external and internal scanners. These solutions are transparent because they
retain  network  communication  during  the  randomisation  process.  However,  the  IP mutation  is
performed at constant interval making it easy for attackers to learn the pattern and initiate malicious
activities.  In  this  dissertation  the  IP  mutation  is  mutated  at  random  intervals  to  improve
effectiveness of the solution against biased scanning techniques.
2.4.3. SDN based network reconfiguration
The Open-Flow Random Host Mutation (OF-RHM) scheme proposed in [14] explains how
varying IP addresses can protect and hide network nodes from worm propagation and scanning
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tools. The solution is proposed for traditional networks and is implemented on the NOX controller
by mapping to DNS records. The vIPs are assigned from the remaining unused IP addresses in a
network  address.  This  scheme  offers  transparent  IP  mutation  while  maintaining  network
configuration and minimizing operational overhead. The proposed solution in this work extents the
idea from OF-RHM into the NFV architecture. Here, a JAVA controller—Opendaylight is used to
transparently mutate vIPs of functions residing in VMs in a data-centre environment. Likewise the
solution is evaluated for scanners inside and outside the data-centre.
S. Robertson et al. in [34] presents another SDN based MTD solution that transforms the
static  nature  of  networks  into  a  dynamic  environment  that  deceives  attackers  from  correctly
identifying network nodes. This solution offers transparent mutation that does not disrupt active
communication  to  legitimate  hosts.  Authors  also  elaborate  that  the  use  of  SDN  enables  cost-
effective security deception solution. Likewise the solution in this dissertation takes advantage of
this  benefit  attainable  from  the  SDN  technology  to  define  security  for  NFV  data-centre
deployments.
The Honeynet solution presented in [35] proposes an SDN based collection of honeypots
called HoneyMix.  The HoneyMix attracts attackers to learn patterns, tactics, and behaviours. The
programmability  introduced by SDN enables  the  solution  to  intelligently  circumvent  attackers’
detection mechanisms and manipulate data in the honeypots. The Mix sets up multiple connections
to various Honeynets and decides the most desirable connection to retain attackers connection. This
solution emphases the benefit of using SDN to manipulate data flows in the network.
2.5. SDN based solution for NFV
2.5.1. SDN based security solution for NFV
There exists a number of solutions that illustrate the benefits of integrating SDN and NFV to
implement network security.  Multistage OCDO in [36] is one such solution that illustrates how
these  two  technologies  can  be  used  to  efficiently  manage  and  manipulate  network  security
functionality  in  a  cloud network.  The solution  partitions  the  network  into  different  blocks  and
groups security chain between end-to-end nodes into different zones. These assignments are used to
generate the availability of software defined security modules (SM) in the nodes of each zone in
each block. The SMs are responsible for translating tenant's security requirements into different
cloud zones. SDN enables optimal placement of software defined security functions per request in
a cloud environment.
The SN-Security Architecture (SN-SECA) presented in [37] is an IEFT draft that presents
architecture  that  aims  to  ensure  effective  security  evaluation  and integration  on the  SDN/NVF
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deployment. This architecture shows how implementation of security solution between the control
and data plane using IPSes, TLS or HTTPS can be achieved. The solution also proposes use of
intermediary  security  devices  such  as  IPS/IDS  to  improve  security  across  the  southbound
communication.  This work proves that SDN can be used to simplify and automate well-known
security algorithms. Likewise SDN is used to implement known security solution to protect the
NFV cloud deployment.
Collaboration  of  companies  in  the  ICT  industry have  presented  Verizon  Network
Infrastructure Planning that proposes SDN-NFV Reference Architecture that suggests how an SDN
controller can be integrated into the ETSI NFV framework [38]. Authors here also explain that the
concepts of network Virtualisation and programmability using cloud computing technologies enable
telecommunications industry to simplify operations, administration, maintenance and provisioning
of networks. This technology also promises to lead us into the next-generation networks which is
5G technology. 
The ETSI NFV ISG is a body that defines requirements that network operators can adapt for
their  receptive  environments.  ONF  presents  [8] a  similar  architecture  to  that  proposed  by  the
Verizon.  The  framework  illustrates  how operators  can  combine  NFV and  SDN to  achieve  the
common goals of both technologies. Figure 2.5 below shows functional blocks of the proposed
model.   The work presented by this  dissertation uses  a  similar  framework that  incorporates  an
OpenDaylight SDN controller into an OpenStack based multi-tenancy NFV deployment.
Secure Data Centre for Enterprise solution presented in [39] is a software defined initiative
defined by Cisco to  provide secure and reliable  provisioning of network services.  Cisco define
Cisco ASA 5585-X cluster that uses load balancing technique by using one device for monitoring
and configuration of the firewall  cluster.  The cluster redirects  the connection flows to a proper
inspection manager process backing up each flow. The centralised control in this solution simplifies
operations, increases availability, enhances security for Data centres. These benefits are attainable
using centralised SDN controller.
NFV can be used to  implement  VNF that  define  security  functionality.  Authors  in  [40]
propose a Deep Packet Inspection (DPI) VNF within a Software-Defined Infrastructure (SDI) that is
responsible for detecting and preventing network intrusions. The DPI application was evaluated on
a SAVI SDI test-bed to  detect and block an attack or to re-direct it  to a  honey-pot for further
analysis.  This  paper  also discusses  cost  reduction  bought  by programmability  of  functions  and
management rules. This dissertation work takes advantage of these benefits hence the solution is
based on SDN.
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Figure 2. 5 NFV-SDN architecture
2.5.2. Benefits of Security based SDN
There are several features of the SDN technology that makes it a promising approach for
implementing network security solutions. The SDN Security consideration in the Data-centre paper
presented in [20] discusses attributes brought by SDN that can be used to implement secure and
manageable cloud environment. ONF white paper [8] also clearly outlines the benefits of using
SDN to secure networks. Below are some of the attractive features of SDN:
 Centralized control: allows for effective performance and threat monitoring across the
entire network. networking devices from multiple vendors.
 Open-Source:  this feature enables open innovation for network operators to customise
traffic flows in their network based on specific network requirements rather than using
vendor specific generalised devices and software. 
 Agile service provisioning: the software based rule can easily be modified and updated to
meet the ever evolving customer requirements.
 Programmability:  this  feature  enables  open  innovation  for  operators,  enterprises,
independent  software  vendors  and  users  to  build  custom-made  traffic  management
depending on individual requirements.  
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 Improved  automation  and  management:  by  using  common  APIs  to  abstract  the
underlying  networking  details  from  the  orchestration  and  provisioning  systems  and
applications.
 Increased  network  reliability  and  security:  as  a  result  of  centralized  and  automated
management of network devices, uniform policy enforcement, and fewer configuration
errors.
 CAPEX and OPEX : automation of network rules makes service provisioning cheaper ad
faster.
 End-user  experience:  as  applications  exploit  centralized  network  state  information  to
seamlessly adapt network behaviour to user needs. 
NFV uses  cloud technologies  to  deploy virtual  networks  in  a  Data-centre.  The solution
proposed by this  dissertation takes  advantage of the attributes  above to  implement  security  for
virtual networks in a Data-centre. 
2.6. Chapter Summary
This chapter studied in detail the concepts of SDN and NFV, and reviewed security solutions
enabled by these technologies. One of the security solutions presented in this dissertation uses the
ideas from SDN based solutions proposed for traditional networks and cloud architectures.  The
solution models NAC for multi-tenancy NFV. This work also adopts the concepts of security zoning
and  MTD  solution  that  implements  network  reconfiguration.  Unlike  other  security  solutions
proposed for NFV, the proposed solutions are based on SDN therefore allowing the Operator to
upgrade and modify the security policies using software whenever needed. SDN enables flexible,
elastic and scalable security management for the dynamic multi-tenancy NFV environment.
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CHAPTER 3
SDN BASED MULTI-TENANCY NFV DEPLOYMENT 
3.1. Introduction
The need by service providers to rapidly and cost-effectively deliver network services has
led to the emergence of Network Functions Virtualization (NFV), which enables network functions
to be deployed as software instances [4]. NFV promises scalability, flexibility and agility for service
providers offering cloud-based network connectivity services to multiple tenants. Since virtualised
network functions (VNFs) for different tenants in a multi-tenant virtualised network environment
often share the same physical infrastructure, appropriate isolation, access rules and security need to
be implemented to protect tenants from each other’s malicious actions, which may be intentional or
unintentional. This dissertation addresses the problem of tenant network isolation, network access
control  (NAC)  and  static  nature  of  network  topologies  in  a  multi-tenant  virtualised  network
environment. These solutions need to be defined and implemented within well-defined multi-tenant
network functions virtualisation framework. This chapter, therefore, presents an elaborate multi-
tenant  network functions  virtualisation  framework,  which  uses  SDN for  automated control  and
efficient network policy implementation.
While NFV deals with virtualisation of network functions, SDN introduces programmability
and automation of virtual network functions. The key feature of SDN is the decoupling of network
control  from forwarding  planes  [2].  SDN also  provides  a  centralised  view and  control  of  the
network, which can play a crucial role in achieving efficient orchestration and automation of the
VNFs.  The  NFV framework  presented  in  this  chapter  illustrates  how  NFV and  SDN  can  be
architecturally  combined,  thus  converging  to  deliver  a  true  ‘softwarised’  network  services
environment. The framework forms a basis for the implementation of tenant network isolation and
security as presented in the next chapter.
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows. Section 3.2 presents an overview of the NFV
framework. Section 3.3 explains virtual components that make up the NFV cloud (the data plane) of
the proposed framework. Section 3.4 introduces the control plane and its interaction with the data
and application planes. The application plane is presented in Section 3.5. Section 3.6 summarises
the chapter.
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3.2. SDN based NFV Framework
As  highlighted  in  the  previous  sections,  NFV  separates  network  functions  from  the
underlying hardware, thus running the functions as software images that do not depend on purpose-
built hardware. Service providers can take advantage of this and move network components to a
common physical infrastructure, which can significantly lower cost and shorten time to market.
These network components can then be controlled and managed centrally and programmatically
using  the  capabilities  of  SDN  [3].  This  dissertation  proposes  to  combine  NFV and  SDN  as
illustrated by the framework depicted in Figure 3.1.
The  figure  shows  several  VNFs  deployed  in  a  cloud-like  setting.  VNFs  that  belong  to
different  tenants  can  be  implemented  within  the  same  physical  infrastructure,  thus  enabling
operators to rapidly and flexibly offer network-as-a-service (NaaS) to multiple tenants at low cost.
The VNFs are in fact virtual machine (VM) instances deployed in a multi-tenant virtualised cloud
environment.  To  accomplish  efficient  multi-tenancy,  it  is  critical  to  ensure  that  there  is  no
interference between the different tenants, as that can pose serious security risks for the tenants. To
this end, this  work comprehensively demonstrates in the next chapter how the tenants sharing the
same cloud environment can be effectively isolated and secured from each other.
The proposed security mechanism is a set of regulatory and addressing policies that cloud
operators can define to ward off intentional and unintentional actions that can compromise tenant
security.  The proposed security  mechanisms and policies are  implemented as SDN applications
within a centralised control entity called an SDN controller. The controller in the framework in
figure 3.1 sits right above the set of VNFs. The SDN controller has complete visibility of the VNFs,
thus making it an appropriate point to initiate and propagate network policy rules. It is worth-noting
that a single SDN controller can be a single point of failure.
To introduce more resiliency and availability, the active-standby SDN controller set-up can
be implemented [1]. In this set-up, when the active SDN controller fails, an automatic fail-over is
performed to hand over the control of VNFs to the standby controller. Another important layer in
the  SDN-NFV  ecosystem  is  management  and  orchestration  allowing  for  user  defined  policy
definitions. The NFV cloud in the presented framework can be viewed as tiered model consisting of
the data plane (VNFs), the control plane (SDN controller, management and orchestration) and  the
application plane (SDN rules that add logic to the control plane) respectively. These planes are
discussed below. The framework in figure 3.1 share some similarities with the SDN-NFV Reference
Architecture and ONF NFV-SDN architectures presented in section 2.5.
21
Figure 3. 1 VNF-SDN Multi-tenant Deployment
3.3 Data Plane in NFV-SDN Multi-tenant Deployment
The VNFs shown in the cloud environment depicted by figure 3.1 form the data plane of the
proposed  NFV-SDN  multi-tenant  framework.  The  data  plane  consists  of  virtual  components—
including a hypervisor—which is a software layer that enables simultaneous execution of multiple
network operating systems (OS) in one compute node [45].  Each OS appears as a self-contained
logical  machine  with  independent  processor,  memory,  network  interface  and  other  computing
resources.  The hypervisor is  responsible for allocating physical  resources amongst  the different
logical machines and ensuring that they do not disrupt each other. These logical machines are often
termed virtual machines (VMs). The physical infrastructure that runs the VMs does not necessarily
have to be purpose-built. Figure 3.2 illustrates the basic components of the data plane architecture
providing VMs that  can  run software  instances  implementing network functions.  Typically,  the
physical  infrastructure  belongs  to  the  cloud-based  network  connectivity  services  provider.  The
provider leases out the VMs to multiple tenants to run their network functions.
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Figure 3. 2 Components of Cloud compute nodes
To optimize network communication among VMs, virtual switches can be introduced. For
the  framework  presented  in  this  chapter  OpenFlow  enabled  switches—Open  Virtual  Switches
(OVS) are used to facilitate communication between VNFs [28]. Figure 3.3. below presents an OVS
and its interfaces. These OVSs are the resources which will be shared by VMs from different virtual
tenant networks (VTN) to forward data between the functions. Figure 3.3. below shows the virtual
interfaces (vIFs) associated with VMs communicated through the OVS to the physical interfaces
(pIFs). The OVSs contains flow tables which define forwarding actions between VMs in one OVS
using vIFs and between adjacent OVSs through the pIFs. The flow table is updated by the controller
through the southbound interfaces.
Figure 3. 3 Open vSwitch with virtual and physical interfaces
23
3.4 Control Plane in SDN-NFV Multi-tenant Deployment
The  control  and  management  plane  of  the  proposed  framework  enables  network
virtualisation through SDN and NFV by providing simple  abstractions  of  the underlying cloud
environment.  This  plane  is  made  of  an  SDN  controller  and  a  cloud  orchestrator.  The  cloud
orchestrator  manages  the  virtual  resources  within  the  cloud  platform  hosting  multiple  virtual
networks, while an SDN controller simplifies monitoring, management and manipulation of traffic
in this environment using logic from network applications residing in the application plane. The
controller  offers  a  scalable,  elastic,  automated  and  on-demand  architecture  necessary  for  the
dynamic  NFV  communications.  This  control  plane  uses  north-bound  APIs  (NB-API)  to
communicate with the network applications and southbound APIs to communicate with the cloud
environment.
3.5 Application Plane in SDN-NFV Multi-tenant Deployment
As discussed in section 2.2, the logic in the control plane is provided by the user defined
network  policies  in  the  application  plane.  This  work  proposes  security  solutions  that  can  be
implemented as SDN applications allowing the cloud operator to protect the VTNs hosted in the
cloud  environment.  One  of  these  solutions  implements  logical  separation  to  ensure  complete
privacy and isolation between different VTNs residing in one compute environment. The proposed
idea aligns with security zoning discussed in the literature review. This proposition is similar to the
concept of Virtual Local Area Networks (VLAN) deployment that is used in traditional networks,
where users in different geographical areas can be brought together in one logical segmentation and
can be granted access to predefined network resources. In a similar manner, the zones define virtual
partitions for which tenants can be allowed to access VNFs that are not necessarily in adjacent
VMs. 
The controller also acts as a security guard monitoring and ensuring only authorised tenants
are allowed into the cloud environment  and that  they access  only their  respectively designated
logical zones. The authentication and authorisation can be implemented by the cloud orchestrator
and, managed and monitored by the SDN controller. The controller takes note of all login attempts
and reports all the failed attempts. This information can then be audited by the cloud operator to
establish the source of any suspicious activities. This functionality enables the operator to timely
notice threats and therefore implement preventive and reactive security measures. This dissertation
also proposes a network reconfiguration SDN based application. The controller uses logic from this
application to periodically re-assign IP addresses of the VMs hosting the VNFs from the unused
address pool for each tenant network.  The application also hops the vIFs of the VMs amongst
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available OVSs in the cloud environment. The controller keeps record of all original IP addresses
and allow only respective tenants to access the VNFs using the real IP addresses. This application
translates actions defined for the original IPs and interfaces to the re-assigned values to enable
transparent end-to-end communication. The application aims to decrease the chance of an attacker
using scanning tools to correctly identify VNFs and their properties.
Figure 3. 4 Security zoning between VM in one OVS
3.5 Chapter Summary
To realise an efficient and scalable deployment of virtual network functions, NFV can be
implemented in an SDN controlled environment. In this chapter, a framework that illustrates how
NFV  and  SDN  can  be  combined  has  been  presented.  The  framework  describes  the  main
components  that  constitute  the  coupling  of  NFV  and  SDN.  The  interaction  between  these
components  has  been explained in  details.  Functionally,  the  NFV and SDN components  in  the
framework fall into three categories: application, control and data planes. The data plane consists of
virtual resources in the form of virtual instances sharing the same physical compute infrastructure
and running software defined network functions. The control plane orchestrates and manages the
data plane virtual network functions using logic defined by the application plane. This application
plane consists of the software defined security solutions proposed for the NFV cloud environment.
The next chapter demonstrates how security mechanisms and policies can be defined at the SDN
controller level to securely isolate the different tenant networks that may share the same physical
compute space.
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CHAPTER 4
PROOF OF CONCEPT IMPLEMENTATION
4.1. Introduction
In this chapter, a proof of concept (PoC) implementation for the proposed multi-tenancy
NFV architecture is presented. Two open-source projects: OpenDaylight (ODL) and OpenStack are
used  to  provide  an  SDN  controller,  applications  and  APIs,  and  for  building  an  NFV  cloud
environment  respectively.  Integration  of  these  two  platforms  enables  implementation  of  the
framework presented in chapter 3. An elaborate discussion is also made on the implementation of
the proposed security solutions. The isolation is achieved by using a built-in SDN application from
the  ODL project,  while  the  access  control  solution  can  be  implemented  using  virtual  private
network (VPN) feature from the Openstack and all the access activities can be monitored by an
SDN controller for any suspicious login attempts. This chapter also discusses in detail the proposed
network reconfiguration application and its main modules.
This  chapter  is  organised  as  follows:  Section  4.2  presents  the  various  components  and
technologies from ODL and Openstack that are used for implementation of the PoC model. Section
4.3  discusses  a  detailed  design  of  the  proposed  framework  and  how the  different  components
interact with each other and it also elaborates on proposed security solutions. Finally, this chapter is
concluded in section 4.4. 
4.2. Tools and Technologies
This section gives a description of the tools and technologies used to implement a PoC
scenario for the proposed SDN based multi-tenancy NFV framework. Various components of the
ODL  project from the Linux foundation are used for implementation of an SDN controller, APIs
and SDN applications. Openstack is used for orchestration of the cloud environment. The PoC is
implemented by integrating these two tools.
4.2.1 OpenDaylight (ODL)
ODL project  is  an  open-source  platform for  SDN hosted  by  the  Linux  foundation  that
encourages academia and industry to come up with solutions and use cases at a rapid pace [43]. It is
a consolidation of components including a pluggable controller, interfaces, protocol plug-ins and
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applications that offer ready-to-install  network solutions [44]. Figure 4.1 illustrates some of the
existing projects under the ODL Beryllium version of 2016. The subsequent section will elaborate
more on the ODL components used for implementation of the proposed framework.
Figure 4. 1 ODL architecture [43]
4.2.1.1. ODL Controller
The controller is implemented as software that resides within a Java Virtual Machine (JVM).
The Beryllium controller uses Open Services Gateway initiative (OSGi) and Representational State
Transfer (REST) as its main northbound APIs (NB-API) [43]. OSGi is used for communicating with
applications within the controller address space whereas the REST is used for applications remote
from the controller. For the southbound interfaces separate plug-ins such as OpenFlow (version 1.0-
1.3) and Border Gateway Protocol-link State (BGP-LS) are part of the platform. These modules are
connected in a dynamic way into a Service Abstraction Layer (SAL) that defines how to accomplish
requested service [44]. 
4.2.1.2. Virtual Tenant Network (VTN)
VTN is one of the applications incorporated into the Beryllium ODL controller. This project
enables construction of virtual networks on top of virtual switches (vSwitches). This work uses
open vSwitches (OVS) which are open-source software switches defined by the Linux foundation
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[44]. Below is a list of built-in VNFs available in the Beryllium VTN package [43]:
 vBridge: a logical representation of L2 network
 vRouter: a logical representation of L3 network
 vTunnel: a logical representation of tunnel
 vLink: a logical representation of physical connectivity tenant network. 
VTN uses a logical abstraction plane to decouple the control plane from the data plane. This
abstraction  enables  users  to  design  and  deploy  virtual  networks  without  stressing  about  the
underlying  network  topology  or  bandwidth  restrictions  [44].  The  designed  network is  then
automatically  mapped  and  configured  into  the  underlying  vSwitches.  The  logical  abstraction
provides simplified resource management of the underlay network, reduces reconfiguration time of
services and minimises configuration errors [43]. The application consists of two components:
 VTN Manager resides inside the ODL Controller and therefore uses the OSGi plugin to
communicate with other modules within the controller. It also has a REST interface for VTN
components configuration in the ODL controller.
 VTN Coordinator is a northbound application that provides a REST interface to the user to
apply the VTN virtualisation. The user configurations will then be referred to the Manager
to deploy.
4.2.2. OpenStack 
OpenStack is an open-source cloud operating system that can be used to control pools of
processing, storage, and networking resources throughout a data-centre [41]. It  enables users to
deploy VMs and other instances which handle different tasks for managing a cloud environment on
the  fly  through  a  web-based  dashboard,  command-line,  or  a  REST API  [45].  An  OpenStack
controller is used to orchestrate the virtual resources in one or more OpenStack compute nodes that
form the cloud environment. OpenStack functionality has been integrated into the Beryllium ODL
project.  OpenStack  uses  a  networking  controller  called  Neutron  to  provide  virtual  networking
services between managed devices [46]. The Neutron communicates with the ODL controller using
the Modular Layer 2 (ml2) plugin as the NB-API. The ODL controller has a Neutron API service
which serves as a northbound interface. The API acquires data from the ml2 and makes it available
to  other  ODL  services.  For  the  southbound  API  OpenStack  uses  Open  vSwitch  Database
Management protocol (OVSDB) which is an OpenFlow configuration protocol designed to manage
OVS implementations [44]. 
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4.2.2.1. Open vSwitches
OpenStack  supports  use  of  Openflow  based  software  defined  virtual  switches  and  for
implementation of the proposed framework Open vSwitches were used.  The hypervisor usually has
finite small number of network interface cards (NICs) that can be shared between the VMs running
in a single host [28]. This limits the number of VMs that can be connected per host. The OVSs
provides virtual interface (vIF) that can be used to connect the VMs to the physical interfaces (pIF)
on the hypervisor which are limited number. These vSwitches enable the cloud environment to be
more scalable [46]. Each OVS has an Openflow flow table that contains action rules for forwarding
data  using MAC addresses, IP addresses or L4 ports.
4.2.2.2. DevStack
 Devstack is a series of extensible scripts used to bring up OpenStack services from the
software repository—git master [45]. It can be used to demonstrate running OpenStack services and
provide examples of using them from a command line interface. It aims to  provide and maintain
tools used for the installation of the central OpenStack services that are suitable for development
and  operational  testing  [45].  It  also  demonstrates  and documents  examples  of  configuring  and
running services as well as command line client usage. The Devstack scripts were used to build an
OpenStack cloud environment in this work.
4.2.2.2. Virtual Private Network as a service (VPNaaS)
VPN is a technology that enables creation of dedicated, encrypted connections to access a
private network. It can be used to set up secure connections from tenant access points into the NFV
data-centre. The VPNaaS extension feature in OpenStack neutron allows tenants to extend private
networks across public telecommunications infrastructure [45]. The extension defines IPSec based
connections  which  is  a  suite  of  protocols  that  provides  IP security  by  offering  authentication,
integrity and confidentiality. The VPN feature includes the following features [45]:
 Internet Key Exchange policy (ikepolicy): a key management protocol that is used for  key
management, recreating and exchanging keys. It is also used to identify, authentication and
encrypt keys during the VPN set up of security associates. 
 IPSec policy: defines a protocol suite used for secure IP communication that authenticates
and encrypts all IP packets for all communication session. 
  Encryption algorithms: This extension supports triple Data Encryption Standard (DES) and
Advanced Encryption Standard  (AES) 128,  256 and192 encryption,  sha1 authentication,
ESP, AH and AH-ESP transform protocol and tunnel or transport mode encapsulation.
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4.2.3. OpenDaylight and OpenStack
The Beryllium ODL platform enables integration of the controller and OpenStack to enable
design and deployment of multi-tenant virtual networks. The VTN Manager application can be used
as  a  network  service  provider  for  OpenStack.  Neutron  enables  OpenStack  to  work  in  pure
OpenFlow environments, in which all vSwitches in the data plane support OpenFlow [42]. This
technology enables creations of VMs on top of the vSwitches and the VMs can be used to host
tenant VNFs. Integration of these two components is used to propose the architecture of the security
solutions presented in this work.
4.2.6. APIs
To  enable  communication  between  the  application  plane  and  control  plane  in  an  SDN
architecture NB-API are used and between the control and data planes the Southbound APIs are
used. Below is a list of APIs that have been used in the POC implementation.
 OSGi: It enables communication between the VTN Manager and the controller. As stated in 
section 4.2.1, this API is used for applications residing within the controller address space 
and VTN Manager is an example of such an application [43].
 REST API: The network reconfiguration application implemented in this work runs in a
different address space to the controller and it therefore uses REST to communicate to the
controller. The REST commands include POST, GET, PUT, PATCH and DELETE that are
used to Create, Read, Update/Replace, Update/Modify and delete respectively [18].
 OpenFlow: It enables communication of control logic function between the OVSs and the
controller. The controller uses OpenFlow to update flow rules in the OVS flow tables and
the OVSs are able to query rules for new packets with no predefined action rules [2]. 
 OVSB: This API enables implementation of Open vSwitch Database management protocol
that allows southbound configuration of vSwitches [46].
4.3. Design
In this section a detailed description on how the tools and technologies in section 4.2 have
been used to implement a PoC system in this dissertation is presented. The section further describes
in  detail  the  proposed  security  solutions–tenant  isolation,  network  access  control  (NAC)  and
network reconfiguration—that are based on an ODL controller .
4.3.1. Multi-tenancy NFV deployment
Figure  4.2  below  illustrates  the  ODL deployment  architecture  that  has  been  used  to
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provision multi-tenancy NFV in data centres. The ODL controller acts as a network service provider
for the OpenStack. VTN Manager has the ability to subscribe to the events from OVSDB running in
one  or  more  OpenStack  compute  nodes.  The  ml-2  plug-in  between  the  ODL and  Openstack
controllers ensures that when Open vSwitch is started to create networking for Neutron, the ODL IP
address is set as the manager [44]. ODL receives updates of the OVS through the management port:
port 6640 [43]. VTN Manager handles the events from OpenStack and adds a bridge with required
port mappings to the vSwitch in the compute node. 
Figure 4. 2 ODL architecture for multi-tenant NFV deployment
Through  the  OpenStack  command-line,  the  Cloud operator  can  create  tenants  and their
respective user accounts using the keystone identity service [45]. Subnets with unique network Id
can be created and associated to respective tenant Id. Tenant administrators can now design their
networks.  When  Neutron  starts  up,  a  new 'network  create'  REST command  is  POSTed  to  the
controller  then  the  VTN  Manager  creates  a  virtual  network  by  translating  the  design  to  the
infrastructure  resources  and  defining  unique  Virtual  Local  Area  Network  (VLAN)  Id  for  each
tenant. The Manager creates a vbridge interface with port mapping for the particular port on the
vSwitch. It also installs flows in vSwitches to facilitate communication between network functions.
The tenant can also add new VNFs by creating new VMs in the OpenStack, the interfaces of
the VM will be added to the integration bridge and network is provisioned for it by ODL’s VTN
neutron bundle [44]. The VTN Manager captures the new PORT and adds a vbridge interface with
port  mapping for  the particular  port.  The  Manager  will  then update flows of  the vSwitches  to
accommodate  the  new  function.  OpenStack  and  ODL communicate  with  the  OpenStack  node
resources through the OVSB and the OpenFlow protocols respectively. Figure 4.3 below presents
the sequence of events when creating a virtual network. 
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Figure 4. 3 Tenant network creation
4.3.2. Tenant Privacy and Isolation
OpenStack assigns tenant Ids and associates them to respective network Ids. The tenant is
therefore not aware of the existence of other tenant networks. When a tenant has designed a network
the VTN Manager maps the network into the NFV infrastructure. In Figure 4.4 tenant A and B are
not aware of how resources in the compute node have been allocated and where their VNFs reside.
Only OpenStack and ODL have the complete view of the compute and networking resources in the
compute  node;  each  tenant  is  only  given  access  to  its  allocated  resources.  This  deployment
mechanism implements isolation and privacy needed for multi-tenancy architectures.
According  to  the  ODL multi-tenancy NFV deployment,  the  VTN manager  maps  tenant
logical virtual tenant networks (VTN) into the physical nodes which will be OVSs in this case. The
manager creates unique VLAN Ids for each tenant network and installs flow entries into the OVS
in-order to forward packets from respective interfaces according to the designed logical networks.
The OVSs use the VLAN Ids to filter traffic of different tenants.
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Figure 4. 4 Tenant logical Isolation
4.3.2. Tenant Authentication, Authorisation and Accounting
The VPNaaS feature in OpenStack can be used to set up secure VPN connection between
the enterprise tenant access point and the NFV cloud. The VPN can be created from the OpenStack
command-line to associate tenant access point IP-address to a specific network Id. The access point
is a peer gateway to the tenant. The ikepolicy will be used for key exchange through the Internet.
Digital certificates—sha1 can be configured using the AES-256 encryption algorithm. The peers
can now negotiate and bring the tunnel up. To limit the risk of attack the Service Level Agreement
(SLA) between tenant and operator specifies connection time for different tasks (network design,
upgrading  or  adding  VNF).  When  negotiating  a  connection,  the  tenant  has  to  include  VPN
description specifying task to perform, therefore the corresponding SLA time will be set as time-to-
life  for  the  connection.  This  feature  guarantees  only  valid  tenants  are  allowed  into  the  cloud
architecture and that each tenant is only able to access VNFs in associated network ID.
While  the  Openstack  neutron  authenticates  and  authorises  tenants  to  their  respective
designated logical network, the ODL controller can be used for monitoring all the login information
and for  reporting all  failed login attempts to  the Cloud operator  for  auditing.  This  enables the
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operator to timely identify any malicious attempts and hence implement preventative and reactive
measures to improve security.
4.3.3. Network Reconfiguration
This  dissertation  also  proposes  an  SDN  based  network  reconfiguration  moving  target
defence  (MTD)  solution  for  multi-tenancy  NFV deployment  in  a  data-centre  that  dynamically
changes IP addresses and vIFs of the VNFs. This can be deployed by a cloud operator to minimise
internal attack initiated from other tenants or from external attacks. This solution decreases the
chance of an attacker using scanning tools to correctly identify reachability of potential targets. An
SDN controller periodically changes the virtual IP addresses (vIPs) and vIFs in tenant networks in
intervals of mutation time (Tm). From each tenant network mask the unused IP addresses will be
randomly assigned as vIPs to the VNFs. The controller also maps the vIFs of the VMs randomly
amongst OVSs in the compute node and updates new interfaces to the VTN vbridge.
An attacker scanning the network will get different IP addresses and location for a single
VNF in different time intervals. The controller is responsible for updating the flow tables in the
OVSs. It maps the original action rules of each VNF to the changing vIP and interfaces to enable
transparent end-to-end communication. The controller will also be used to update DNS responds by
responding with the vIP for the queried device.
The IP reconfiguration solution allows only the rightful owners of the virtual networks to
use the original IP addresses—real IP (rIP) to access the functions. First a tenant is authenticated
and  then allowed to  access  the  VNFs using  the  original  flow entries  created  when  the  virtual
networks were deployed that defines traffic flows using the rIPs. The controller acts as the central
authority managing IP mutation, mapping vIFs amongst OVSs, installing flows in the OVS and
responding to DNS requests. The proposed solution is built of three main modules discussed below
that use REST API for the northbound communication. 
4.3.3.1 vIP Assigner
  The controller has record of all functions in each VTN and corresponding virtual interfaces
connecting  to  the  functions.  Each tenant  network  created  in  Openstack  has  a  defined  network
subnet-mask that determines the number of addresses—block size—that can be allocated to unique
functions. The number of OVSs in the cloud environment are also noted and all usable vIF are seen
as one pool of interfaces. From the unused IP address range in the vIP assigner randomly selects and
assigns vIPs for all interfaces in a VTN and maps the vIFs to a different interface from the vIF pool
in the cloud environment. This action is performed periodically in intervals of the selected Tm. The
assigner has to ensure that a vIP or vIF is not assigned to more than one function at a time to avoid
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collision  and that  it  is  not  assigned one  function  in  consecutive  mutation  intervals  to  increase
destruction and confusion for an attacker attempting to scan the network properties.
4.3.3.2 DNS responding
 When a DNS query is sent to resolve the name of a host, the DNS response is updated by the
controller to replace the rIP of the network nodes with currently active vIP. The controller also sets
the  TTL value  in  the  DNS  response  to  a  small  value.  The  source  host  can  then  initiate  the
connection using the vIP of the destination. After Tm time interval all vIP will be mutated meaning
that successive DNS queries of the same nodes is likely to give a different vIP causing confusion
and complexity for a potential attacker.
4.3.3.3 Network Address Translation (NAT)
After every mutation interval performed by the vIP assigner the controller updates the NAT
with new vIPs to corresponding static rIPs. When a source sends packets for the first time the OVS
encapsulates and sends the initial packet to the controller. The controller installs flow entries in all
the OVSs in the route to the destination host that translates the vIP to the rIP and initial vIF to
current vIF hence packets will be forwarded using action associated with the rIP and original vIF to
ensure transparent communication. All the OVSs in the route will be configured to route traffic
based on vIP addresses. Successive packet can now be matched and forwarded by the OVS within
the virtual networks according to the installed flows. The NAT application guarantees transparent
end-to-end reachability of hosts, because the rIP-vIP and vIF translation for a specific connection
remains unchanged regardless of subsequent mutations.
 The algorithm for the proposed system is presented below. The OpenDaylight controller
first identifies the unused IP addresses in the network and adds vIFs from all OVSs into a pool of
vIFs in the cloud environment. This IP range will be used to assign the vIP for the VNFs. The
controller also hops vIFs of the VNFs to randomly selected interfaces from the pool. The controller
is also responsible of responding to DNS request by giving out the current vIP of the functions. 
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                                 OpenDaylight IP reconfiguration algorithm
1. determine unused IPs in network block
2. determine number of OVSs in compute node 
3. aggregate all usable vIF in pool of interfaces
4. for (packet p from OVS) 
5.      if (p.type = Type-A DNS response for hos hi) 
6.            set DNS address to current vIP(hi)
7.       else if (p.type=  TCP-SYN or UDP from hi to hj )
8.              if (p.src in internal)
9.                    install in flow in src OVS with
10.                      action srcIP(p)= vIP(hi)
11.              else
12.                  install out flow in src OVS with
13.                     action dstIP(p) = vIP(hj)
      14.        else if (p.dst = rIP) 
      15.            if (hi  is authorised tenant) 
16.                   install in and out flows in OVS
17.         else (p.dst=vIP)
18.                install in flow in src OVS with
19.                     action srcIP(p)= vIP(hi)
20.                install out flow in src OVS with
21.                       action dstIP(p) = vIP(hj)
22.  for all mutation of each host hi do
23.      if (vIP not used)
      24.             set vIP(hi) to new vIP
      25.      else 
      26.             find another vIP   
      27.              set vIP(hi) to new vIP
      28.      if (vIF not used)
      29.             map vIF (hi) to random vIF
      30.     else
      31.           find another vIF
      32.           map vIF (hi) to random vIF  
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4.4 Chapter Summary
To  validate  and  evaluate  the  multi-tenancy  NFV framework  and  its  proposed  security
solutions from chapter 3, this Chapter presented a PoC implementation. The tools and technologies
used to implement the framework are introduced and a detailed discussion about how different
component interact is made. The ODL project is proposed for implementation of the SDN controller
with  APIs  enabling  communication  to  various  SDN  applications  and  the  cloud  environment.
Openstack is proposed for implementation of the cloud environment providing VMs that are used to
host  the  VNFs.  Devstack,  which  is  a  series  of  scripts  used  to  quickly  bring  up  a  complete
OpenStack environment is used for the proposed PoC. The Openstack and ODL are intergrated
allowing the controller to manipulate the traffic flowing in OVSs within the cloud environment. The
chapter  further  introduces  the  proposed  security  solution:  Tenant  isolation  that  sets  up  logical
partition between virtual networks in one cloud , AAA  ensure only rightful tenant access only their
respectively  allocated  resources  and  monitor  any  suspicious  login  attempts,  and  network
reconfiguration that randomly mutates IP addresses and vIFs of the VNFs in the order to confuse an
attacker attempting to scan the network.
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CHAPTER FIVE
EXPERIMENTAL PERFORMANCE EVALUATION AND VALIDATION
5.1 Introduction
The previous chapter explained the interaction between the different tools that are used to
build a proof of concept (PoC) for the proposed SDN based multi-tenancy NFV framework. This
chapter evaluates and analyses the efficiency of the proposed security solutions. First, an analysis is
made on the isolation mechanism proposed between virtual tenant networks (VTNs) residing in one
compute node. The evaluation is made based on traffic, address space, control and performance
isolation metrics. A test scenario is presented and analysed to justify the logical separation between
the  VTNs.  The network  reconfiguration concept  is  also  analysed and evaluated based on three
merics: deception, deterrence and length of flow table against scanning tools that are normally used
by  attackers  to  probe  a  network  for  vulnerabilities.  Due  to  constraints  in  resources  and  time
evaluation of the network access control (NAC) solution has been included as part of future work.
5.2 Isolation Enforcement
In  this  section  an  analysis  is  made  about  the  effectiveness  of  the  isolation  aspect
implemented for virtual networks in a multi-tenancy NFV deployment. As elaborated in section
4.2.1 the VTN Manager application residing within the OpenDaylight (ODL) controller  address
space  is  used  for  mapping  tenant  networks  into  the  cloud  environment  ensuring  isolation  and
privacy  between  individual  networks.  The  VTN  Manager  achieves  virtual  network  functions
(VNFs)  isolation  by  using  the  concept  of  virtual  local  area  networks  (VLANs)  that  allows
implementation  of  port  groups  associated  with  unique  VLAN  Ids  for  each  VTN.  The  ODL
controller then updates Openflow tables within the Open virtual switches (OVSs) in data plane, so
they can use the VLAN Ids to filter traffic for different tenants. In this section, an analysis is made
based on : Traffic Isolation, Address Space Isolation, Control Isolation and Performance Isolation. 
5.2.1 Traffic Isolation
The VTN Manager ensures that service chaining and traffic routing defined for individual
virtual  networks  affect  only  traffic  flow for  the  designated  network  [44].  This  is  achieved  by
updating the action rules in the flow tables of the OVSs using the Openflow v3 protocol. The ODL
controller  also  provides  northbound APIs  (NB-API),  which is  the  REST API in  this  case,  that
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enables  tenants  to  insert  policies  on  the  fly  without  concerning  about  the  complexities  and
arrangement of the physical plane. The VTN manager then implements the intended logic for that
particular tenant without affecting traffic in colleague networks.
5.2.2 Address Space Isolation
The virtual networks created in the OpenStack dashboard have independent network Ids
with unique subnet masks [44].  This feature allows communication between VMs in one subnet.
The VTN manager maps the VNFs running inside virtual machines (VMs) into the compute node
resources and decides to which OVS each VM will be attached. The VTN manager further deploys
layer 2 isolation by introducing VLAN Ids which are independent and unique for each tenant [44].
The Openflow rules installed in the OVSs filter traffic between the different tenant virtual networks
using both the VLAN Id and IP addresses. This implies that knowing the network mask of a VTN is
not enough to initiate communication with the VNFs. This enables the logical zones as proposed in
chapter 3 and offers isolation between tenant networks. 
5.2.3 Control Isolation
In  the  proposed solution,  tenants  have  the  complete  control  over  their  accounts  and all
configurations created by a tenant are mapped to the corresponding domain by the VTN manager
[44]. This dissertation proposes authentication using tenant Id and security certificates to ensure
only the rightful network administrators are allowed into the cloud environment, and that they only
have access to only their respectively leased resources. Each tenant is only aware of corresponding
VM Ids hosting their respective VNFs. Tenants only have access to the logical designs of their
networks but are not able to affect the actual global administrative configurations implemented on
the cloud environment. 
5.2.4 Performance Isolation
The logical isolation implemented by the VTN Manager also isolates performance metrics
between the virtual networks. Any performance metric varying in one network will not be able to
affect  colleague tenant networks. These  metrics include congestion, link fail and security attacks.
Deviation in one of these metrics in one network will only affect the performance in that particular
network [44]. The VTN Manager ensures that each tenant is confined in only allocated resources.
5.2.5. Isolation Test Scenario
To evaluate the NFV isolation and privacy solution proposed in section 4.3.2  a test scenario
is set up based on Openstack cloud environment that is managed by an ODL controller. The VTN
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manager within the controller address space was used to set-up three VTNs illustrated in figure 5.1
using REST commands on the ODL command line interface (CLI). The figure presents the logical
view  of  the  networks  and  the  physical  layer—which  represent  the  OVSs  in  the  Openstack
environment that are able to forward packets using Openflow defined action rules implemented by
the VTN manager. VMs of each virtual network are added to one VLAN Id and same port group
defined on the OVSs. To enable communication within one VTN, the OVSs  uses the combination
of destination virtual interface (vIF) IP address and VLAN Id to select action rule from the flow
table.  If  there is  no flow entry with this  combination,  the first  packet will  be forwarded to the
controller and the controller will then update the flow tables of all OVS that will need to handle this
type of traffic. This test case focuses mainly on traffic and address space isolation between tenants
in a single compute environment. The hosts and virtual function were instantiated as VM in the
Openstack environment. 
Figure 5. 1 Network Topology observed in Openstack
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Figure 5.1 above shows that host 1 and server 1 belong to VTN 101, host 2 and server 2 to
VTN 102, and then host 3 and server 3 are members of VTN 103. VTN 101 and VTN 102 are
assigned the same network ID. Each of the two virtual networks provides basic IP End-to-End
connectivity and consists of one virtual router (vRouter) separating two L2 switches (vBridges)
with the IP spaces 10.0.0.0 /24 for the hosts and 10.0.1.0/24 on the server side. The hosts in VTN
101 and 102 are assigned IP address 10.0.0.1, the virtual interfaces on the three vRouters 10.0.0.254
and for the server side all the two servers are assigned 10.0.1.2 with gateway 10.0.1.254. VTN 103
is assigned IP block 10.0.2.0/24 for the host network and 10.0.3.0/24 for the server side. For testing
the isolation, the Iperf tool [48] was used to make simultaneous connections from the hosts to the
corresponding servers. Each host attempts to set up a TCP connection with their respective server. 
5.2.6. Analysis of Results
As expected, all end-hosts 1, 2 and 3 were able to successfully connect to corresponding
servers on the other end of the VTNs. As explained in Section 4.5.1, The VTN manager maps the
virtual networks into the physical devices and aggregates interfaces for each VTN into logical port
group that below to a unique VLAN Id. Despite the same IP address set in VTN 101 and 102 the
OVS are able to forward traffic using the defined logical isolation. The OVSs are able to filter
traffic of the respective tenants using the VLAN Id which is unique for each tenant. In real live
deployments each Tenant has a distinct network mask and therefore traffic of respective tenants will
never in any way overlap or interfere. The Iperf results below depict the sample captured packet
flow in the respective VTNs above. From the code it can be observed that even though the IP
addresses  are  the same the MAC addresses  of  the host VMs and server  VMs are different  for
VTN101 and VTN102. Therefore the VTN Manager ensure traffic and address isolation by using
unique VLAN ids for each tenant.
    Packet from host 1 to server 1 in VTN101:
Packet from host 2 to server 2 in VTN102:
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Packet from host 3 to server 3 in VTN103:
            The VTN manager allows tenants to define only the logical design of the network and it will
deploy the design of the actual cloud environment. Therefore tenants do not have access to change
any configuration in the data plane. This ensures control and performance isolation within the cloud
environment.
5.3. Network Reconfiguration
  The network reconfiguration solution proposed in this dissertation reduces chances of an
attacker correctly identifying IP addresses and location of  VMs hosting VNFs in an Openstack
environment. This is achieved by dynamically assigning virtual IPs (vIPs) for the VMs from unused
address space, and hopping virtual interfaces (vIFs) amongst the OVSs in the Openstack compute
node. This application uses VTN manager REST commands to update action rules in the OVS flow
tables to facilitate communication of the newly added vIP and vIF maintaining the tenant defined
logical design and service chaining. In this section the effectiveness of the reconfiguration solution
is studied and evaluated using  the following metrics:                                  
5.3.1. Deception                                                               
The reconfiguration mechanism proposed in this dissertation invalidates attackers’ view and
assumptions of the virtual networks [14]. This metric measures the ratio of targets that an attacker
falsely identifies targets compared to misses in static networks. Assuming Nr and Ns denote number
of scans made for an attacker to identify the correct network details in the reconfigured network and
static network respectively.  Deception ratio  can therefore be computed as Nr  /Ns.  This measure
calculates the percentage of resources that evade the attack by deceiving attackers. 
5.3.2. Deterrence
This metric compares time an attacker takes to identify on which OVS is the VM connected
to and what is its IP address to time that is taken to identify nodes in the static network with the
same configuration. Assume Tr is time taken to complete a scan and correctly identify nodes in the
reconfiguration enabled network and Ts as time to complete scan in static networks. The deterrence
ratio can be defined as Tr/Ts. This metric quantifies time cost exerted on the attacker to successfully
complete a scan in a reconfigured network.
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5.3.2. Flow Table Size
In  static  networks,  flows  are  normally  matched  using  destination  addresses  which  are
stationery, the length of flow table in the vSwitches is an order of O(n) [33]. For the proposed
reconfiguration solution two flows—one for rIPs and the other for vIPs—must be defined for all
sessions between hosts. For n hosts that take an average of s seconds to establish connection and the
session lasts for t seconds, according to Little's law the length of the flow table is 'nst'.
5.3.2. Network Reconfiguration Scenario
This section presents the experimental scenarios carried out on a VTN constructed in an
Openstack  environment  and  controlled  remotely  by  the  VTN  Manager  residing  within  the
OpenDaylight Beryllium controller. VTN 101 from section 5.2.5 was set up for the evaluation of
reconfiguration solution on a data plane made of three OVSs that were assumed to have 20 vIFs
each. 1000 experiments were conducted each for 3 different randomisation intervals (30, 60, 120
and  no  mutation)  using  the  attack  interval—time  between  adjacent  attacks—of  30s.  The
randomisation interval implies the time interval between controller's next mutation. The network
mutation algorithm presented in section 4.3 is implemented as a JAVA program automating REST
commands to re-assign the VM IP addresses and vIF port mappings, and to update flow tables in the
OVSs  to  enable  continuity  of  communication  with  the  VTNs.  The  table  below  shows  the
experimental parameters used to validate the network reconfiguration concept.
                                        Factorial Experimental Parameters
Network size 10-to-10
Randomisation Technique IP Address and vIF Randomisation
Randomisation Interval(s) 30,60,120 and static
OVS(s) 3 OVSs with 20 vIFs each
Number of experiments 100-1000
Attack interval 30s
5.3.3. Network Reconfiguration Results
The results below presents  the experimental data collected using the Wireshark tool [47]
based on the above experimental parameters. For different mutation intervals a study was conducted
on how many scans are needed and time for successful identification of VNFs. A study for flow
table length was made by varying number of sessions established per second for different mutation
intervals . 
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                         Figure 5. 4 Length of flow-table per mutation interval
5.3.3Analysis of Results
The proposed network reconfiguration solution for multi-tenancy NFV deployment reduces
the chances of correctly identifying IP addresses of the VMs hosting tenant VNFs and their location
within  the  NFV cloud.  The  results  above  demonstrate  the  effectiveness  of  this  moving  target
defence (MTD) technique. Figure 5.2 shows the success of each individual attack between nodes for
different mutation intervals. For all the mutation intervals, the success rate fluctuates for the initially
small number of samples and then becomes more stable as the number of attacks increases. This
figure shows that as mutation interval is reduced (mutation frequency increased), the individual
attack success ratio also decreases, as can be observed from the figure success rate is reduced by
40% for the mutation interval of 30s compared to a static network. This implies that as the mutation
frequency increases an attacker  needs to perform more scans than in the static  network.  It  can
therefore be concluded that the deception ratios increase as the mutation frequency increases.
Figure 5.3 also clearly shows the effect of the proposed MTD technique. When the mutation
interval  is  reduced,  the  success  rate  of  correctly  identifying  the  VMs  decreases.  This
experimentation was conducted for 3000 seconds. When the configuration is static, the number of
completed attacks is 240 out of 1000, while for the mutation interval of 120s the number is reduced
to 50 and an adaptation interval of 30s allows only 5 successful attacks. This figure also explicitly
shows that as the mutation frequency increase more time and number of attacks are required to
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successfully identify VNFs therefore it can also be concluded that the deterrence and deception
ratios increase as the frequency increases.
To achieve better deception and deterrence ratios higher mutation frequency should be used.
However, this will require a network with large block size and unused addresses. A network with
largest  unused  address  space  can  be  assigned  non-repetitive  vIP address  in  adjacent  mutation
intervals causing more confusion to an attacker. The size of network block therefore directly affects
effectiveness of the reconfiguration solution.
Although  it  has  been  observed  that  increase  in  the  frequency  of  mutation  increases
complexity and difficulty for attacker, this on the other hand increases the length of flow tables in
the OVS switches and also causes some jitter. Figure 5.4 illustrate that for increase in number of
sessions per second results in longer flow table with increase of mutation frequency. 
5.4. CHAPTER SUMMARY
This  chapter  presents experimentations that were carried out  as proof-of-concept  for the
proposed multi-tenancy NFV and the proposed security solutions. An analysis was made to evaluate
the effectiveness of the logical separation implemented by the VTN manager to isolation VTNs
deployed in one physical compute node. The isolation was analysed by the metrics: traffic, control,
address  space  and  performance.  The  given  test  scenario  illustrates  that  the  OVSs  use  the
combination of  IP address  and VLAN Id to  filter  traffic  between tenant  networks.  The VLAN
technology enables logical isolation of the networks residing in one compute node and therefore
tenants are only aware of their networks and cannot in anyway affect other tenants. The network
reconfiguration concept is also analysed and evaluated based on four metrics: deception, deterrence
and flow table length against scanning tools that are normally used by attackers to study network
topology  and  its  vulnerabilities.  From  the  presented  test  scenario  it  has  been  observed  that
increasing the frequency of mutation increase the deception and deterrence ratio hence making it
harder  for  an attacker  to  correctly  identify  the VNFs location and IP address.  The results  also
implies that an increase in IP address block enables non-repetitive use of of the vIP and also brings
more confusion and deception to an attacker. However shorter mutation intervals results in larger
flow table size in the OVSs.
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CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSION
6.1 Introduction
In this chapter, a brief summary of the content of this dissertation report that have been 
reported in the preceding chapters is presented here. The chapter also discusses an extension that 
can be made of this work in the future in order to improve and evaluate in the proposed security 
solutions in this dissertation. 
6.2. Conclusion
Network Function Virtualisation (NFV) and Software Defined Networks  (SDN) are two
independent technologies that promise network flexibility, increased network and service agility,
and support service-driven virtual networks using concepts of virtualisation and softwarisation [2].
Integration  of  these  technologies  enables  cloud  operators  to  provide  network-as-a-service  to
multiple tenants in a data-centre deployment.  NFV defines network work functions as software
instance that can be run on any compute node, whereas SDN proposes a centralised architecture that
decouples control plane from data plane and introduces network programmability, which makes it
possible  to  dynamically  control,  change,  and  manage  network  behaviour  through  software,
providing programmable interfaces into the network. 
Despite the benefits brought by these technologies, they also bring along security challenges
that  need  to  be  addressed  and  managed  to  ensure  successful  deployment  and encourage  faster
adoption  in  industry.  This  dissertation  illustrated  the  benefit  of  using  the  two  technologies  to
complement each other by designing, implementing and analysing security solutions focused on
tenant isolation, network access control (NAC) and network reconfiguration for an operator offering
network-as-a-service (NaaS) to multiple tenants in a data-centre.
The isolation is achieved by implementing logical separation of resources residing in the
same hardware to ensure tenant privacy. On the other hand, NAC can be achieved by implementing
authentication, authorisation and accounting of tenants to access only their respectively allocated
resources. The network reconfiguration is implemented by randomly mutating the IP addresses and
virtual  interfaces  of  the  network  functions.  These  solutions  have  been  implemented  as  SDN
applications making it  possible to intelligently and flexibly control traffic flows to achieve best
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network throughput, perform traffic monitoring and analysis, and smart intrusion detection using
customised user algorithms [2].
This dissertation reviewed the NFV and SDN concepts and their respective architectures.
Existing  security  solution  proposed  for  multi-tenancy NFV are  revised  and their  strengths  and
weaknesses analysed. SDN based security solutions proposed for traditional networks and cloud
architectures are  reviewed and used to model  the NAC and security  zoning solution for multi-
tenancy NFV. The moving target defence solutions proposed in the past are also reviewed and a
technique of network reconfiguration is extended to the NFV cloud. 
An SDN based framework with data plane, control plane and application layer is proposed
for implementation of the multi-tenancy NFV deployment. The data plane consists of the cloud
environment comprising of virtual resources that can be used to host tenant VTNs. The control
plane is built of a cloud orchestrator and an SDN controller. The cloud orchestrator manages the
virtual  resources  within  the  cloud  platform  hosting  multiple  virtual  networks,  while  an  SDN
controller simplifies monitoring, management and manipulation of traffic in this environment. SDN
applications are the software defined network policies that enable a cloud operator to protect the
VTNs hosted in the cloud environment.
A proof of concept ( PoC ) implementation of the proposed SDN based NaaS architecture on
an Openstack cloud environment has been demonstrated. The PoC is based on integration of two
open-source platforms—OpenDaylight (ODL) project and OpenStack. The NFV cloud environment
is  implemented  using  OpenStack  that  virtualises  the  physical  compute  node  resource  into
independent virtual machines (VMs) that are used to host the VNFs for different tenants. The ODL
project is a consolidation of components including a pluggable controller, interfaces, protocol plug-
ins and applications that offer ready-to-install network solutions [43]. An ODL controller and the
VTN  application  from  ODL  are  used  to  orchestrate  security  solutions  for  the  NFV  cloud
environment. The VTN manager uses REST commands to the OVS switches in the compute node.
Experimental  set-ups  were  implemented  using  the  tools  proposed  for  the  PoC  and  the
proposed security solutions for multi-tenancy NFV deployment were evaluated and analysed. An
analysis was made to verify the logical isolation aspect proposed between virtual tenant networks
(VTNs) residing in one compute node. From this analysis, an observation was made that member
VMs assigned to individual VTNs can only communicate within their home VTN and are not aware
of existence of other virtual networks. The network reconfiguration concept is also analysed and
evaluated based on three metrics: deception, deterrence and flow table length against scanning tools
that are normally used by attackers to study network and  its vulnerabilities. An analysis made
shows  that  increase  of  mutation  frequency  increases  the  deception  and  deference  ratio  hence
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making it harder for an attacker to correctly hit on target VNFs. The results also implies that an
increase in IP address block enables non-repetitive use of a single virtual IP address (vIP) and also
brings  more  confusion  and deception  to  an  attacker.  However,  it  has  also been illustrated  that
shorter mutation intervals results in larger flow table size in the OVSs.
This  dissertation  designs,  implements  and  evaluates  security  solution  use-cases  that
illustrates  the  benefits  of  integrating  an  SDN controller  into  the  NFV architecture  to  simplify
implementation and management of security in the dynamic NFV environment. These SDN based
solutions  allow  automation  of  security  policies  hence  enabling  scalability,  programmability,
network  and service  agility  at  the  same time reducing CAPEX.  The controller  can  be used to
modify or upgrade security rules based on newly discovered threats or tenant requirements.
6.3. Future Work
6.3.1 Network access control (NAC) solution
Because of constraint in resources, the evaluation of the NAC solution proposed presented
in  section  4.3.2  for  the  multi-tenancy  NFV environment  has  been  added  to  future  work.  The
efficiency of this solution can be analysed by studying the strength of the security certificates and
the limitation to accessing cloud environment. Tenant administrators should only be authorised to
access their respective allocated resources in the multi-tenancy cloud environment.
6.3.2 Network Reconfiguration
The Overhead caused by the proposed reconfiguration solution can be studied in detail in the
future.  The delay  experienced  on active  sessions,  when the  first  packet  gets  to  the  OVS after
mutation,  while  the  controller  is  updating  the  flow  tables  can  be  studied  and  its  impact  on
transparent end-to-end communication can be analysed. The DNS delay implications that can be
expected  by  nodes  when  an  IP  address  change  occurs  during  reconfiguration  can  also  be
investigated in the future.
A security detection solution can be proposed to work with the network reconfiguration
algorithm presented in this work to reactively respond to an attacks by mutating interfaces of VNFs
that have been compromised to different OVS interfaces. In this dissertation the solution only pro-
actively protect VTNs against potential attacks but does not consider cases when the attack has been
successful.
6.4. Chapter Summary
This chapter has given an overview of the work presented in this dissertation report. It gives
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highlights on the design and implementation of the proposed SDN based NaaS framework and
security solutions. It also provides an insight on the effectiveness of the proposed framework and
security  solutions.  Future analyses  that  can be done on the proposed NAC and reconfiguration
solutions were also presented.
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Appendix A: Experimentation
A.1 Set-up and configuration
This section describes in detail how the actual components used to implement the multi-
tenancy  NFV  cloud  environment  that  is  managed  by  an  SDN  controller  are  configured  and
integrated  to  work  with  each  other.  The  goal  of  this  part  is  to  guide  the  reader  through  the
installation and configuration steps of the controller and the cloud environment.
A.1.1. System Requirements
The ODL controller Java virtual machine was implemented in a computer with the following
specification: 6 Cores CPU, 6 GB RAM, 300 GB Hard drive and Ubuntu 14.04 64 bit Operating
System.  The Openstack  was configured  using  Devstack  in  Virtual  machine—Oracle  Virtualbox
environment with the following properties: 4 Cores CPU, 6 GB RAM, 32 GB Hard drive, 3 virtual
network  adapters—NAT,  Host-only  and  Bridged—and  Ubuntu  trusty  server  64  bit  Operating
System.
A.1.2. CLOUD Platform Set-up
Devstack Mitaka was used to provision an OpenStack based cloud environment using the
latest versions downloaded from a git master downloaded from [47]. This deployment was installed
in an Ubuntu trusty 14.04 server residing in a virtualbox environment. Deployment of the Devstack
scripts enabled one Openstack controller node and one compute node. When stacking the devstack
script, neutron was enabled to communicate with OpenDaylight. This was achieved by adding the
code extract below to the local configuration file—localr. This file contains all custom settings for
Devstack.
The “./stack” command was executed to run the devstack scripts and bring up the Openstack
cloud environment. The code extract below shows command used to set ODL controller as manager
for the OVS in the Openstack compute node.
55
  
The Openstack dashboard shown in figure 7.1 below was accessible on the browser in the
local machine, it can be used to create virtual networks using Open vSwitch kernel switches and to
display existing ones. The internal network addresses were chosen from class A network ranges. To
simulate external hosts, we designated one of these subnets as external subnet. 
Figure 7. 1 Networks created in OpenStack
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A.1.3. OpenDaylight
On a Ubuntu 14.04 host machine, JAVA and Postgre packages and dependencies, needed to
compile the VTN application, were installed using the command below:  
         Berryllium OpenDaylight project .tar file was downloaded from [43] and the controller can 
be configured to  run in a Java virtual machine. 
     
The VTN Manager, which is a built-in application within the controller, was installed using
the command below. This enables the Manager to use neutron networking to communicate with
OpenStack through the rest API.
The odl-ovsdb-openstack feature was installed in the controller to enable use of the OVSBD
protocol for communication with the OVS in the OpenStack environment. The odl-dlux installs the
controller Web portal. This portal is available from on the host machine on URL: http: localhost:
8088 and it can be used to view the switches connection and network connection in the Openstack
environment. Figure 7.2 displays sample of the network topology in the Openstack environment
display in the ODL user interface. Below is the list of features that were enabled in the controller to
allow integration of Openstack and OpenDaylight. 
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Figure 7. 2 Network Topology observed in Openstack
A.1.4. VTN Manager and OpenStack
Virtual Tenant Network (VTN) manager application residing within the controller was used
in order to control and manage the networking. VTN creates a virtual networking environment, in
which each network inside is a different VTN and is managed as an independent network. Below is
a list of REST commands (POST, PUT, GET and DELETE) that were used to create tenants and
map the VTN to the Openstack environment.
A.1.4.1 Create VTN1
curl --user "admin":"admin" -H "Content-type: application/json" -X POST \http://localhost:8181/ 
restconf/operations/vtn:update-vtn \ -d '{"input":{"tenant-name":"vtn1","update-mode": 
"CREATE","operation":"SET","description":"creating vtn","idle-timeout":300,"hard-timeout":0}}'
A.1.4.2 Create  vBridge for VTN1
curl --user "admin":"admin" -H "Content-type: application/json" -X POSThttp://localhost:8181/
restconf/operations/vtn-vbridge:update-vbridge \ -d '{"input":{"update-mode":"CREATE", 
"operation":"SET","description":"creating vbr","tenant-name":"vtn1","bridge-name":"vbr1"}}'
A.1.4.3 Create  first interface for VTN1
curl --user "admin":"admin" -H "Content-type: application/json" -X POST\  restconf/operations/vtn-
vinterface:update-vinterface \ -d '{"input":{"update-mode":"CREATE", "operation": 
"SET","description":"Creating vbrif1 interface","tenant-name":"vtn1","bridge-name":"vbr1","interface-
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name":"if1"}}'
A.1.4.4 Map VTN1 to physical interface
curl --user "admin":"admin" -H "Content-type: application/json" -X POST \  restconf/operations/vtn-port-
map:set-port-map \ -d '{"input":{"vlan-id":0,"tenant-name":"vtn1", "bridge-name": "vbr1","interface-name":"if1", 
"node":"openflow:1","port-name":"s2-eth1"}}'
Appendix B: Publication
The conference presentation and paper below have resulted from this dissertation:
1.  R. Lejaha and J. Mwangama, “SDN based security solution for Multi-Tenancy NFV,” South
African telecommunication network and application conference (SATNAC), September, 2016.
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